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These decisions were all signed by
Education Commissioner Michael Williams
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ISD Circumvented Mother’s Lawful Right
To Inspect her Child’s Assessment Documents
Ruling: A school district violated Texas school law by not allowing a mother a reasonable and timely opportunity to inspect assessment documents related to her son. Parent v. Killeen ISD, No. 002-R8-09-2014.
The mother had initially asked to inspect her son’s Diebels Next Benchmark assessments, SRI assessments, SMI assessment protocol, student answer and response sheets, teacher composite scores, and student oral responses so that she could be prepared to participate in a Sec. 504 committee meeting to determine whether her son qualified for dyslexia services.
The decision recounts numerous instances in which the mother was reportedly told by district staff that they would be happy to allow her to inspect the test documents if she would give them one working day’s advance notice, but the test documents were never provided for her to inspect, even after the mother provided several days notice in advance.
The commissioner termed each of the district’s offers to provide the testing materials for the parent to review as “illusionary” and he ruled that the district did not provide a justifiable reason for withholding the requested documents from the mother.
The commissioner concluded that KISD violated these sections of the Texas Education Code (TEC) by failing to allow the parent to review her child’s testing documents after she gave reasonable, repeated notice of her intent to review the documents:
-- TEC §26.006, entitling a parent to review each test administered to the parent’s child after the test is administered, while allowing the school district to specify reasonable hours for the review.
-- TEC §26.008, entitling a parent to full information from a school district regarding the school activities of a parent’s child.
The commissioner also overruled the mother’s claims that KISD violated TEC §26.0081, which requires the TEA to provide school districts with information, for distribution to parents, concerning special education and the education of students with learning disabilities. Only the TEA, and not school districts, can be found in violation of this section of school law, the commissioner ruled.
The commissioner ordered KISD to produce the test documents for the mother.
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Two Parents’ Appeals are Denied
The commissioner dismissed these appeals:
-- A parent’s complaint that a district failed to protect a student. The commissioner can’t rule on this complaint because it does not involve violations of Texas school laws or of written school employment contracts. Parent v. Edinburg CISD, No. 001-R10-09-2014.
-- A parent’s complaint that a school employee committed perjury by lying under oath about the parent’s child during an administrative proceeding, and thus violated the educators’ Code of Ethics. Parent v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford ISD, No. 011a-R10-10-2014.
The commissioner rejected this appeal for the same reasons as listed in the decision above, plus for the additional reason that SBEC, and not the commissioner, has jurisdiction over educator Code of Ethics violations.
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Special-Ed Administrator had a Term Contract
Ruling: An ISD improperly ended the School Year 2013-14 employment contract (at the end of the contract’s term) of a special-ed administrator without affording her the proper term-contract protections (proper notice, opportunity for a hearing, etc.) to which she was entitled.
AISD claimed that it could lawfully end Fields’ employment as a special-ed instructional coordinator at the end of School Year 2013-14 without triggering Texas Education Code Chapter 21 term-contract protection provisions. The district contended it could do so because her “adminstrator term contract” for that year was not a “term contract” under school law Chapter 21 provisions and because she was not in one of the named positions (superintendent, principal, assistant principal, school counselor or nurse) that met the relevant definition of a “teacher” for term-contract school-law purposes.
The commissioner concluded otherwise, based on: 1) her contract and related list of duties, 2) the requirement that she be certified and 3) the provisions of a prior court decision in which a similar situation arose regarding an “other full-time professional employee” who was required to be employed under a Chapter 21 term contract.
Ordered: Because AISD did not properly end Fields’ 2013-14 contract, the district is required to employ her in the same professional capacity for School Year 2014-15.